Intro:
In my original review of the William Lane Craig vs. Sam Harris debate on the ontological foundations of moral realism, I gave my initial impressions of why Harris pulled his weight in the debate. In a later post, I elaborated in context of Christian bafflement that anyone could think Craig didn't win. There are different ways to score debates and while some people focus on technical points others focus on content and presentation. If you were convinced by Harris' positive case that good and evil necessarily relate to the well being of conscious creatures and noted that Craig has double standards when it comes to evaluating Harris' views (as Harris clearly pointed out in the debate), then how could Craig have won the debate? Clearly, it's murky because Harris didn't address every single argument that Craig launched, but neither did Craig address all of Harris' claims.
A debate is a framing war and both parties are allowed to frame debates however they want (as you can see here). Agreeing to the title of the debate, "Does good come from God?" is very open to interpretation. Craig wanted to have a very narrow technical debate on his own terms and Harris simply denied him that and leveled criticisms against the entire Christian worldview (as Harris explains). If Craig is agreeing with Harris about moral facts in application, that allows Harris (as a matter of coherency) to channel that back into a criticism of the full worldview we all know Craig defends and that the vast majority of the Christian population watching the debate believes in (at the expense of Harris' alternative). In other words an average Christian at home could easily conclude, "I'm a good person, I believe that morality is real and important and yet why am I invested in this clearly horrible religious perspective when I don't seem to need any of it to keep being a good person?" So what a lot of people wanted to call Harris' red herrings and irrelevant to the debate is really just a Craig-centric frame bias (which in a sense does score some points for Craig, since people bought it). However, if you accept Harris' frame, then everything Craig said was superfluous and hypocritical. Either way, neither side took the bait of each other's frames (though in the Q&A, Harris shows Craig's theistic views, not Craig himself, to be inherently psychopathic), and yet clearly Harris offered the most relevant snipe on the technical side of the debate (in which case Craig only has argument via excess of irrelevant technical points).
Even so, I've been covering some of the "drops" (in debate speak, where a debater doesn't address arguments), like the issues around deterministic responsibility (even though "free will" wasn't the issue of the debate either). Christians have been doing the same and so let's see what they have to say in Craig's defense.
To recap the circularity issue, I'll let a Christian, sympathetic to Craig, point it out:
If this were a boxing match, although Harris would by now be battered, bleeding and barely conscious, this observation comes like a surprising jab just when we thought the losing fighter had no energy left:
Dr Harris says that Craig has merely defined God as intrinsically good. But this is a game of definitions, which is precisely what Craig accused Harris of.
Harris is correct. The opportunity for this point arose simply because Craig did indeed say that God is by definition the greatest conceivable being and therefore he is perfectly good – and in the context of a debate about moral goodness this appears to mean morally good. As I’ve noted previously, Dr Craig can manoeuvre his way out of this objection without too much difficulty, but it certainly is a situation that needs to be manoeuvred out of.
Whew...I was afraid only fellow xangan, Fletch_F_Fletch, was going to be a Christian who agreed with me that there was an issue here. Moving on...
Notice that a Christian named, Bnonn, in a post titled, "How William Lane Craig thrashed Sam Harris like a naughty puppy," thinks he's said something:
...Craig brought in Perfect Being Theology. [...] If God is the perfect being, then it follows he is also morally perfect, and so his nature is the locus or grounds of that which is good. This accounts for moral values...
What's the definition of "perfect" and "morally perfect" again? And why should we accept those definitions in a non-circular way? This is classic theistic philosophical retreat to yet another iteration of the exact same problem.
Notice when explaining "Perfect Being Theology" on his website, Craig never gets around to telling us how we know what is greater than not.
These moral stop gap sentiments are as circular as they are typical in the "not my religion" genre of responses from Christians like Micah:
...the response I and a lot of other Christian thinkers have offer is that there is a third option: namely that something is good because God is good. God is the standard for morality to which all others measure up to. God being good and being moral is essential to His nature. What this implies is that God’s commands are not arbitrary at all, but rather expressions of His nature. What this also implies is that God does not obey moral laws, but rather He is goodness itself.
So yeah...Christians have had thousands of years to get out of Euthyphro's dilemma, and that's all they've come up with. It'll probably take them another thousand years to figure out they've just widened the dilemma to include more vacuous options.
J. W. Wartick says:
Craig notes that God is the greatest conceivable being, so to ask “Why should we think God is good?” is like asking “Why are bachelors unmarried?”
Further, he points out that Harris has yet to answer the schoolyard question, “Why?” Why, on atheism, should we think that the worst possible state of affairs is objectively bad? We might not like it, but that doesn’t ground it objectively.He closes by saying “All together now, ‘says who?’”
Ugh. Yet more lameness. Let's rewrite that for the sake of helping Christian philosophers everywhere find a greater sense of philosophical awareness that they seem to be relentlessly lacking more often than not:
[Harris] notes that [the worst possible state of affairs is bad], so to ask “Why should we think [the worst possible state of affairs is bad]?” is like asking “Why are bachelors unmarried?”
Further, he points out that [Craig] has yet to answer the schoolyard question, “Why?” Why, on [theism], should we think that the [greatest conceivable being] is objectively [good]? We might [like it], but that doesn’t ground it objectively. He closes by saying “All together now, ‘says who?’”
Did I even need to do that? Really? Apparently I did.
Marcus McElhaney, who concludes that "...divine command theory is far from rebutted," says:
Why should the reasons why God gives his commands be superior to God? He made and set up those reasons also. He is not playing by anyone else's rules. God made up the rules, the environment, and is in complete control.
McElhaney may have his own version of theology, but most of the Christians here seem to think that the Christian philosopher's god would be equal to his own nature and commands. If we "correct" for that, McElhaney isn't saying anything, and if we allow him to go off the grid, his god is just an amoral wild card who does "whatever" based on any old nature it happens to have independent of any notions of "good" or "evil." Morality would then be a relative frame of human reference that points to whatever arbitrary binds are being dropped down on us. Logically possible ontologically, but no particular reason to call anything "good" or "bad" in anything but that subjective sense Christians seem desperate to avoid.
Apparently that is the move that Dr. Glenn Peoples (the Christian I originally quoted at the beginning of this post) would like Craig to make when he says:
Now, I know what Craig’s response could be to this, and he would be right. He could abandon this talk of what moral nature God has by definition, and say that it’s just the case that God is good in a non-moral sense.
But this advice, as I've said, merely bites the bullet and admits that goodness is just as metaphysically arbitrary as an evolutionarily inherited nature. So theism gets slightly more coherent, but it loses its negation of a goodness conception that is more immediate and evident (since it's in our own heads and observable in other people's words and actions).
Peoples says:
But even speaking of non-moral goodness, it’s not a problem to say that as a matter of fact God is good (i.e. loving, just, forgiving etc).
Like we can say that humans, as a matter of fact can be good, loving, just, forgiving, etc.? Why do we need a god for that?
Peoples says:
Has Craig defined God as good as Harris alleges? No, says Craig. God is worthy of worship. God is the greatest conceivable being and he is the greatest good. Asking why God is good is like asking why all bachelors are unmarried. It’s part of the concept of being God. But this, rather than deflecting the objection, only seems to confirm its correctness. That bachelors are not married is a matter of definition, so drawing this comparison suggests that Craig is indeed saying that God is good by definition.
Burn... Good so far. Let's continue:
A far more effective comeback would be...
To "mad lib" quote Peoples from earlier in his post when speaking of Harris' necessary justifications for naturalistic moral truth: "...hopefully what he means is that he’s about to present his argument that [god is good in a non-circular way]. I was waiting with bated breath. [Peoples] proceeded:"
A far more effective comeback would be available if we maintain that God is non-morally good. For then we Craig could say “Wait, let’s be careful not to equivocate. This debate is about the basis of objective moral goodness. If we have a creator who issues commands, then there is such a basis. If God is non-morally good, then what he commands is good in the sense that it reflects God’s mercy, justice and so on. But none of this means that God is morally good at all, let alone by definition.”
Riiiiiiiight. So it's okay to be definitionally circular when it comes to "good good" but not "moral good." Whatever dude.
Outro:
I could have sworn Craig told us we weren't allowed to do any of these definitional games, yet every Christian in response is doing just that. Bring on the hairsplitting. I will eagerly catalog every bit of it. Till I get bored, at least. ;)
Ben
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