May 22, 2009

  • Bill Vallicella & "Compatibilism and Moral Responsibility"


    Intro:

    Bill Vallicella over on Maverick Philosopher (link) argues for libertarian free will [1] and against compatibilism [2]. He sets up the basics of compatibilism rather well [3], then adds one further component that he believes it cannot deal with [4].  However, what he fails to realize is that his third criteria when properly understood is the same as the first criteria [5].    

    Vallicella gives an example to show that we do things apart from our pre-determined desires:
    ...I did not will and execute my backpacking excursion while in the grip of wild passions, but after calm thought and for presumably good reasons: to benefit from a particularly strenuous form of exercise; to appreciate the incredible beauty of John Muir's "Range of Light"; to have intense experiences impossible down below, etc.

    All Vallicella has to see is that there is a spectrum of passions at work here.  There are "wild passions," and then more subdued, patient passions that are content to be satisfied on a longer time table.  This allows us to navigate in a seemingly more dispassionate way via the use of reason.  Vallicella would not sit down to use his reason if he did not WANT the anticipated "intense experiences."  In other words we still WANT to use reason in order to acquire the fulfillment of the desire and this is inescapable. Reason is a tool and not a motivation in and of itself. 

    Vallicella does not bother to justify the belief that we sometimes do things in a literal indifferent sense [6] and it is interesting to see him point out the obvious contradiction in Leibniz's position [7] along those same lines.  One might think Vallicella could easily correct himself on the issues he is getting wrong here.  However, Vallicella moves on to challenge compatibilistic moral responsibility: 

    When I keenly regret and feel guilty about doing something or leaving something undone, I have a sense of moral responsibility. I say to myself: I ought not to have done that! (Think of a case of genuine moral as opposed to prudential regret.) Since 'ought' implies 'can,' I infer that it was within my power to refrain from doing the regrettable deed. And that means: it was within my power to refrain from doing the deed even given all the antecedent and circumambient conditions and all the motives and excuses swirling before my mind at the time of the deed.

    I would not dispute that most people probably feel that way.  However it is the philosopher's job to investigate deeper and make sure things are actually as they appear [8].  Vallicella begs the question by presenting the fact that he has the wrong idea in another context.  If your strongest desire at the time was to do what you now think is the wrong thing, nothing changes the fact that it was your strongest desire at the time.  Why would have you done it if it wasn't?  Taking those hindsight feelings too seriously entails a logical contradiction that you can magically feel and not feel a certain way at a given moment in your personal history that is long gone.  Even libertarians would agree that once a decision was made the decision was made, wasn't it?  Everyone, including an "open theism" god, knows what it will always have been.

    Vallicella: 

    In short, moral responsibility entails libertarian freedom of the will. If I were free merely in some such compatibilist sense as the one above defined, then there would be no accounting for one's sense of moral responsibility. One could of course claim that moral responsibility and regret for past misdeeds are illusory psychological phenomena.  Accordingly, one feels guilt and regret, but these emotions are not revelatory of anything: one simply did what one had to do in the circumstances, and it is a mistake to feel guilt or regret or moral responsibility. But if one holds that they are not illusory, then I think one is committed to libertarian freedom of the will.

    If we aren't trying to justify some absolutist moral cosmic scheme with moral infractions of the past that "still mean something" no matter what, it is easy to see that the "guilt and regret" one feels in the present can channel into revealing what the more appropriate behavior would be in a similar future scenario [9].  Thus it would in fact be a mistake to not feel guilty about it if you reason that you should do otherwise in a future circumstance [10].

    Outro:

    Obviously any sensible understanding of compatibilism shows that moral responsibility still has a perfectly legitimate place. 

    Ben

    Notes:

    [1]  Libertarian free will (link) is the idea that the will is completely or at least partially undetermined by anything prior to the decision.  I reject this view primarily because it amounts to what I call, "free will tourettes."  If you truly do things for no reason, then it is by definition completely random.  (back)

    [2]      Compatibilism (link) is the idea that free will, when properly understood, is compatible with the idea of a deterministic universe.  This is my view and yes, I live in that horrible world where I am forced to do what I want to do.  :p  (back)

    [3]      Vallicella: 

    I meant that I was doing what I wanted to do as I wanted to do it. I was not subject to any external or internal impediments, or any external or internal compulsions.


    Note this is basically the same definition I recently gave to Wintery Knight (link).(back)

    [4]  Vallicella: 

    3. P's willing (wanting, etc.) to do A is motivated by reasons rather than passions, and is indeed motivated by good reasons. 

    Even if we were motivated by reasons instead of passions, did we give ourselves our reasons?  Did we decide how keen our intellectual faculties really are?  As I argue in the text, clearly reason serves our other more patient desires.  Either way though, Vallicella is clearly mistaken.  (back)

    [5]  Vallicella: 

    1. P wills (wants, desires, chooses, etc.) to do A. 

    (back)


    [6]      Vallicella: 

    Some of us believe in an absolute spontaneity of action. We feel ourselves to be the unmoved movers of (some) of our actions, whether these be such mental actions as decision, or the physical implementations of decisions.  This is called the liberty of indifference. 

    I demonstrated the contrary in my post, "J. P. Holding & 'Psychological Egoism'" a long time ago.  We may feel like we do things for "no reason," but on closer inspection this is not really the case.  What we really mean is that we may do something "just because" for no vastly important reason and we exaggerate.  It is emotionally inefficient to get into the little details and so it is simple to say you had no reason (or desire), when in fact you did.  It was just a dull reason (or desire).  It's still a personal desire of some sort and if we truly had no self interest at all in doing something, we simply wouldn't do anything at all.  In the link provided, I explain this as it applies in different circumstances.  (back)

    [7]  Vallicella: 

    Inasmuch as Leibniz holds that reasons incline without necessitating, he rejects determinism and embraces liberty of indifference. For a determining reason is a necessitating reason. But he plainly states that all actions are determined. So he rejects liberty of indifference.

    Vallicella manages to rhetorically elude contradicting himself but the error is basically the same.   (back)

    [8]  Otherwise we will naturally create a philosophy of superficial appearances.  While it is somewhat understandable why many theists and other types of libertarians may desire to maintain this natural disposition of the human mind, that doesn't stop it from having all the technical difficulties that come along with it.  Such appearances may even be desirable to maintain (though I think it too often just complicates things further in complicated situations), but that doesn't mean we should take them seriously in an ontological sense if we really want to understand what is going on. (back)

    [9]  Or even in terms of properly adjusting your current self image in light of your past misdeeds you wish to psychologically distance yourself from.   The only practical effect in this case is figuring out who you are even if you never stumble into similar circumstances ever again. (back)

    [10]     Or even if it is appropriate to prevent or condemn someone else in a current analogous circumstance for the sake of the greater good of yourself and those around you.  With a mere slight adjustment of our sensibilities, it is obvious our guilty feelings on the matter are not in error.  They help put us on the sociological/moral map.  (back)