I have a problem with premise one.  I don't know what you mean by "moral."  Also, you seem to have a whole host of enthymemes in that premise.  Who defines what "moral" is?  How does "moral" relate to "evil?"  Is any man competent to judge others--(especially including God!)?  How does knowledge relate to competency as a judge?

@WAR_ON_ERROR - No, I still don't know what you mean by "moral."  What is your basis for thinking that something is evil or good?  Can you define good/evil without relying on a biblical understanding?  Or do you accept the biblical understanding of good/evil and seek to establish that believing in God is absurd or that the way that the Bible views good/evil is absurd?  If you avoid using the biblical definition, then you have the problem of getting others to accept your definition.  If you accept it, then you may still not understand the definition, since a lot of exegesis would be involved.  I think that the problem is a can of worms.

@WAR_ON_ERROR - I would say that, generally, you are trivializing complex stuff.  My reply should give you a hint that your argument is inadequate.  Do you want Bryan involved?  He always gives helpful feedback, in my experience.

Premise 1:  Doesn't classical theology define God as goodness itself because He perfectly conforms to His essence (pure actuality)?

Response 5:  You seem to be relying heavily on a very narrow definition of the word "perfect."  If this is the best possible world then it would still be accurate to say that God is entirely without fault or defect (definition 1a from Merriam-Webster).

I'm too sober and under slept to shift the map over to the right, so I'll just start on the left-hand side for now.

While the response to the classic theology may be to say that we have to give up part of it, that need not be the case. It could be that our interpretation of it is wrong. That is a response I'm sure we've all seen before: i.e., what we consider to be evil actually isn't evil in the eyes of God. Therefore, God remains pure, and it is our perception of evil that is in error. This sort of goes to what SDFL was getting at with "what is morality?" We need to have a clear definition of good and evil.

It is true that premise 2 does inform us that, at least with regard to God creating man, we are supposed to be refrain from "impurity," but that still leaves the concept of "good" (pure) nebulous. That passage also needs to be taken in context. It may not be itself a moral maxim so much as a statement about conduct of people. So the maxim is that people should avoid impurity. This is characteristically different than a statement that is making a metaphysical claim about the nature of moral reality (i.e., that there isn't evil in the world or shouldn't be). Musterion brings up a good point in that God may be all good, but that does not require it to avoid putting evil in the world. As she says, the evil in the world can find its source in man, in which case the argument from evil needs to attack the crux of that issue: why does God allow his creation to be evil? This is where apologetics steps in to address that to have freewill requires allowing us to make errors, to be impure, to fail, etc. In permitting that we can learn, grow, love and be independent of just being made to be good. Otherwise, the moral maxim that we should avoid impurity wouldn't make sense if we were designed to be pure. We wouldn't even have a morality; we wouldn't be autonomous!

Of course, this would still leave open the interpretation where God condemns you for your failures that he permitted you to do in the first place. That is where I find the argument from evil most significant: how can one receive an eternal punishment for a human mistake? So even if we admit, for the sake of argument, that the Bible is correctly interpreting morality and human creation, then we still face the problem whenever anyone interprets the issues regarding punishment and hell, etc., because such an interpretation is so far repugnant that it demands we refuse God. It isn't going to be a logical argument since it is contradictory, but who the hell would submit to a God that says "here, I'll leave it up to you to do this right, make you so that you are designed to fail, and if you don't self-correct I'm going to make you suffer for eternity!" Yeah, fuck you God. That is about the only response a rational human being can have! Of course, not everyone interprets it that way. Usually fundamentalists make this interpretation. I don't think it is as widespread, but who knows what the reality of those proportions are (but fundamentalists are a minority; them with Catholics make up the simple majority, roughly).

So the argument from evil is not an attack on the fact that evil exists and it is incompatible with God existing. The argument most telling is the one that attacks specifically how God relates to there being evil in the world--namely, a God that demands an infinite punishment for a finite crime should not be a God to which anyone wants to submit. Those that do under those interpretations must have something wrong with their moral compass. Upon other interpretations God can coexist just fine with evil in the world. Those qualitative differences between interpretations must be recognized so that we know which parameters lead to which paltry versions of God.

I'm still unconvinced that there is a valid logical argument from evil.

Why must a Christian accept premise 2?  How do you show that it is impossible that there could be some greater good which could only be achieved by permitting some amount of evil?

Why should a Christian accept your definition of moral perfection?  Couldn’t someone morally perfect still choose to prevent a murder if she only had time to either prevent the murder or stop a shoplifter?  She would have allowed a preventable evil, but was constrained in such a way that she needed to allow the small evil in order to prevent a greater evil and bring about the best possible outcome.  You can define moral perfection as either always making the perfect moral choice, or as bringing about an outcome without any evil.  Since we typically evaluate moral agents by whether they always make the morally best decision, the former seems like a better definition.  In that case, God could still be perfectly good without “grading on a curve”.

In Response 1B_2 it seems like you’re just saying that the universe intuitively seems morally ambivalent to you.  Many Christians intuitively see God’s love exemplified in all parts of the world.  For it to be a valid logical argument from evil, you need to prove your point, not just beat Christians over the head with your intuitions.

@soccerdadforlife -@Jayman777 - @musterion99 - @bryangoodrich - @Inquiring Infidel - @StrokeofThought - Thanks for all the feedback.  I've updated the argument map accordingly.  

@WAR_ON_ERROR - You may want to add an Objection 0DB such that:

Christians or non-Christians claiming something "evil" does not necessarily imply it is actually evil in the eyes of God.

We clearly have a discord between what is actually the case and what is perceived to be the case. Of course we have to question whether we know something is evil, but that is a fundamental paradox: we don't know. Agnostics and many Christians are willing to accept this ignorance, while still believing in God (or not). To claim something actually is the case is tantamount to claiming to have knowledge of the case. Anyone that claims as much puts themselves into a very difficult position because then they need to justify how it is the case that such perceived things are, in fact, evil. The fundamental question arises: how do you know God perceives that as evil?

I just get reminded of something Joe Rogan said ("Talking Monkeys in Space")

"Maybe God made a monkey that doesn't like to think it's a monkey and lies a lot."

Sure, some people think God gives them insight, and they'll claim to know something of the mind of God. They're probably full of shit. They can believe it all they want, but it isn't knowledge, nor warrants such a status. If it isn't knowledge, no one can claim it to be how God perceives his creation. Therefore, the response that what Christians claim is evil is what God perceives as evil does not follow.

@WAR_ON_ERROR - 

Your response is that if what I said is true, there's nothing to punish on judgment day.

Agents are still responsible for their evil actions even if on the whole it is a good thing that the world exists.  A man killing his father can fit into a world that is worth having.  But if the son doesn't repent, he is still morally culpable for his actions, and should be punished. 

But the fact that there is an evil agent in the world is irrelevant if the world on the whole is a good one.  A narrow instance of evil is only an objection to God's existence if it entails that the whole set of features that comprise the world would make for a world that God would morally unjustified in creating.  I don't think narrow instances of evil do entail this, given the kinds of arguments I gave above about why narrow instances of evil allow good things which we would otherwise not be able to have.

So you are missing a link from narrow instances of evil (there being evil agents who perform certain evil actions) to your conclusion that the world is one God would be unjustified in creating.

@WAR_ON_ERROR - Well, now that I've worked my way over to the right-hand side of the map, I do have something to say about response 3B_1A on responsible parenting. It seems a bit out of place to impose upon God our traditional values of good parenting, because to achieve that generalized maxim that "if we could make our children behave perfectly moral, then we are obligated to make them behave perfectly moral" may require that we erase their freewill. So then we are faced with a decision: to have freewill or not, and God will take care of the rest. Clearly freewill is presupposed to have a great significance; so to have freewill requires allowing human failure to occur. How God handles that (say, Floods or Apocalypse) is still questionable and suspect, but the fact still remains: we are in no position to impose a moral maxim on God's parenting.

This all also brings up a policy issue: should God be an interventionist? Atheists seem to criticize God a lot about what he's not doing when there is suffering in the world--as if it is his responsibility to prevent suffering. Who says God is supposed to intervene? Certainly he is supposed to have the power to, and by not intervening does not mean he is too weak, lax or apathetic. It still is a fundamental challenge: is he supposed to intervene? I rarely ever see anyone justify why God is morally obligated to prevent anything, other than some loose statement about "suffering exists, God is all loving, and any caring person would prevent suffering if they could." Well, says who? That is wholly unrealistic, regardless of one's capabilities. For one, the evils we face, the suffering we incur, and the tragedy of life is what makes life worth living. If we lived in a paradise without worry or fear, we'd be some mindless dumb animals growing fat on our apathy to do anything. No one struggles to achieve greatness if greatness is handed over to them on a golden platter. Maybe God knows enough that a more hands off approach is better for humanity in the long run, even if he intervenes occasionally or in small ways, if at all. I mean, if he did it right, he wouldn't have to do a damn thing! Tragedy may be built into it. Life sucks (or, as Buddha says, life is suffering), and maybe that is a good thing after all.

Good work, sir.

JT

@WAR_ON_ERROR - I believe 3B_1A is another red herring in reply to my comment. What you described as perfect will is not freewill but actually limited will. If we have true freewill, we must be free to choose evil.

In 3B_2A you say you are just evaluating. Ok, well so am I. I'm responding to your evaluation with my evaluation.

"It may be worth it to you and me, but "on balance" concepts are not concepts of moral perfection by their very nature and hence cannot justify a morally perfect God."

For any action that an agent might perform the action is either morally justified, morally neutral, or morally unjustified.  There aren't any other options.  A morally perfect agent is one that performs no morally unjustified actions.

What makes an action morally justified?  There exist certain good-making properties in the world, such as an instance of something being a kept promise, something being pleasurable, something being an increase of a virtue, when something issues respect another agents deserves, and so on.  Wherever these properties occur they tend to make the action that would instantiate them morally justified.

Oppositely, there are also bad-making properties.  These include things like something tending to cause pain, the breaking of a promise, disrespecting an agent, and so on.  Wherever one of these properties occur they tend to make an action morally unjustified.

There are lots of both kinds of properties, and then of course there are also morally neutral properties.  For instance, that the car you are considering buying is a green one makes no moral difference to the situation.  And so on for lots of other obviously morally neutral properties.

When there is an action we are considering doing that will instantiate both good-making and bad-making properties, it becomes an action for us to contemplate morally.  Is it a morally justified action?  Many famous ethical scenarios are predicated upon such combinations of good-making and bad-making properties, such as the one in which a train is headed for five people, and it is up to you to switch its direction so it will only kill one.  There are good-making properties and bad-making properties to weigh and consider, and the fact that both of them are a part of the action sometimes makes the answer unclear.

So the question is, are there any actions which include bad-making properties which are good/morally justified to do?  Yes, there are.  It is good to study for a test, even though it will cause you stress.  It is good to give blood, even though it makes you lose blood and there are risks associated with it.  It is good to fight in just wars.  It is good to go to the dentist.  It is good to lie to save someone's life (in many cases, at least).  It is good to fight off a would-be rapist.  And so on, and so on, and so on.

So whether or not there is something which is - in itself - a bad-making property in the world does not matter.  Why?  Because God did not just actualize that instance of the world, he actualized the whole world.  That is the action under evaluation.  That action is one, like all others, which is either morally justified, morally neutral, or morally unjustified.  In order to have an argument which impugns God's moral perfection, your conclusion must be that it was morally unjustifed.   To do this, you have pointed to instances of evil, and also to the fact that some agents in the end will be judged as totally corrupt.  However, this doesn't get you close to your conclusion.  Why?  Because there are a lot of other properties in the world which you have left out which make the world one which God was morally justified in creating. 

Now, if there are any bad-making properties in the world that are unnecessary for the existence of some good-making property, then God is morally culpable for allowing it when he didn't need to.  The problem is that it seems bad-making properties are so inextricable from the achievement of certain good-making properties, that they have to be in the world if we are going to have those good things.  And many of those good things seem very worth having, as mentioned above. 

So I think God's action of creating the world is analagous to many of the moral decisions we have to make; good-making and bad-making properties coincide all the time.  And there are some actions with bad-making properties that are morally justified.  As long as that's the case, you don't have an argument.  The mere fact of a bad-making property occurring in the world gives you nothing, since there are counterexamples to the proposition, "Any agent A who performs an action T that brings about about any bad-making property P is necessarily a morally flawed agent in that respect."  I can bring about P and still have done nothing wrong.

So to get to the conclusion that God is morally unjustified in having created this world, you need to either argue the bad-making properties in the world outweigh the good (the evidential argument from evil), or argue that there are bad-making properties instantiated which lead to no good thing at all (a claim I am nearly certain no human has the warrant to make).  As it is, there has been no good argument given that God is not morally perfect, given the way the world is.