Tuesday, 22 April 2008
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Mr. Jargon's Informal Survey
Hello [everyone],
I'm doing a kind of informal survey to satiate my curiosity. My question is whether or not you are an ethical/moral realist? I am not asking whether or not you believe that morality can exist without God; I am asking whether or not you believe that nontheism is true *and* objective moral values exist. The most sophisticated nontheistic thinkers I have encountered or read thus far (Bertrand Russell, J.L. Mackie, Keith Augustine, Quentin Smith, etc.) have (1) denied that objective moral values exist and (2) agreed that their existence presupposes or would constitute strong evidence for theism.
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/moral.html
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/jeff_lowder/martin_review.shtml
[Mr. Jargon]
“I am not asking whether or not you believe that morality can exist without God; I am asking whether or not you believe that nontheism is true *and* objective moral values exist.”
Two different things, huh? ;) You could've fooled me.
Objective moral values are only as real as they appear to be. Incidentally the person noticing is also only as real as he/she appears to be. Both patterns are on a similar level (hence, to fall back on a previous example, "that computer" is really in front of "you"). Too often when one "understands" the one they forget to also "understand" the other. Hence if you only put the one side of the equation in perspective and not the other, you end up reloading the wrong perspective again and finding contradictions where none exist. This is what I call, "yang neglect." If you are using the terms of the emergent personal sphere, you use the terms of the personal sphere. If you use the terms of physics, then you use the terms of physics. If you use the terms of your understanding all of existence, then you use those terms. Each of which is merely a different level of accuracy, but you don't pit the levels against each other like a mad scientist and expect anything but monstrous results.
Any immediate pattern is just what it is and remains that way because our ability to evaluate what it is (and deal with it) is on equal terms. Our "is" we brandish without a second thought should be taken in light of that and not necessarily presumed to supersede it. It's not so much that the patterns (for instance, a moral pattern) we encounter aren't real, it's just that if we are looking to be philosophically precise, virtually nothing in middle world we know is the best frame of reference for all our "brute fact" assessments. Our normative patterns aren't fake, they're just not absolutely existentially accurate. I'm sure every version of realist and anti-realist both have the same thing going on in their head when they experience their keyboard at their desk. What does it matter what label it is given? Granted when you dwarf a given pattern with an infinity of everything it apparently isn't, the original seems quite trivial, but then again we don't exist at that level so it doesn't matter and we are back at "yang neglect" yet again. There's an apparent divide, but not a relevant one.
Richard Carrier (Sense and Goodness, pg. 120) "Current cutting edge science is already suggesting that everything else about the universe (matter, energy, physical law) derives solely and entirely, in some way or other, from the geometry of space-time. This is the powerful explanatory prospect offered by Superstring Theory, for example, which has made amazing strides towards explaining all manner of bizarre things about subatomic physics. Other theories are converging on the same conclusion. Only time will tell, but for now this is the most plausible conclusion: matter and energy are geometric properties of space-time, and all physical laws follow therefrom."
It should be clear we live in a persistent state of objectively uncertain terms and we can only assign the label "objectively" insofaras those uncertain terms allow. You shouldn't be asking whether we can be a consistent "nominalist." You should be asking whether we can be consistent. Carrier seems to treat abstract entities just as I do almost to the extent our passages are simply reworded. If he isn't a nominalist, then apparently I'm not either.
(pg. 31): "Now an early mistake can be made, a wrong turn taken. If this idea of meaning is not realized, it is easy to forget what things really mean, to get confused about what words refer to. I think Plato got confused. By not realizing that words are names that people made up to describe their sensations, he got around to thinking that ideas, even numbers, had a supernatural substance, that they were themselves distinct 'things', more than mere labels or codes. There are people who still think this even today..."
From my perspective there are a number of lines of evidence that suggest we can only be so consistent and that apparently there are more consistent brands of thinking than others. There's no reason to assume we've been guaranteed the ability to have mathematically precise epistemology and it seems to be a logical impossibility since even the Christian God could never be certain he wasn't besieged by a Cartesian demon and might only be duped into thinking he had all the attributes he's supposed to have. Math is based on givens and givens are assumed. That doesn't mean we just accept any so-called given, but at some level you can't escape it and in fact no one can. There will always be a state of flux. Recognizing that does not make it not a state of flux.
I'm not sure if it even makes sense to concede as others have that "if objective moral values existed that would constitute good evidence for theism" since all of the loaded architecture of the statement is incoherent and would not make sense in any possible world. However fellow atheist, Keith Augustine, said this:
"I think it is perfectly possible that objective moral laws exist in some Platonic realm of ideas, but I think it is implausible that such is the case."
I couldn't disagree more. About the same moment they exist in the Platonic realm is about the same point that they no longer mean anything. I can have ten different kinds of measuring sticks propped up on my wall over there yonder, but I can't imagine that magically making me obligated to use them in the same swoop no matter what supernatural substance they may be made out of. It's free association and we still haven't explained what we originally set out to explain. Thus, I can't imagine "objective moral values" "existing" in the way that theists tend to assert any more than I can imagine a circular square. One might as well say, "The existence of circular squares would make good evidence that married bachelors exist." Um...yeah, I guess so? Or not. Augustine even argues from his atheism, and that's something I don't approve of. One would have a very fucked up philosophy if they started defining their worldview from the basis that unicorns don't exist. "Since unicorns don't exist and their magic horns were what granted us the ability to have good fortune, it follows that we will have no good fortune as a-unicornists." Certainly unicornists would rejoice with such sustained idiocy, wouldn't they? Granted he clarifies what audience he's aiming at, but that's inherently avoidable epistemic weakness and seems to be the primary element that distinguishes his way of thinking as an atheist, from mine. I argue independently and abstract entities in the platonic real sense don't make sense in any possible world regardless of who the audience is (even if it's just me in my own head). If I were a theist, I still wouldn't be a platonic realist.
Augustine also says, "Decisions will vary between people with different thoughts on a subject, hence it is reasonable to argue that moral values are subjective and vary with individual conscience."
Yep, no correlation whatsoever. lol, I pity my team. How else can we correct our own moral method or discern that someone else's moral ways are better than our or deficient? There has to be something objective about it in order to pull that off.
Elsewhere he said, "Once an individual or community has accepted a general set of basic moral premises (e.g. murder is wrong), moral disputes can arise when applying those premises in real-life cases--such as when one has to choose between two children joined at the head at birth when only one could survive an operation."
Apparently he's abandoned any criteria for sorting out good moral premises from bad moral premises. Unfortunately it seems, he has merely allowed himself to fit too much the mold his opposition has set out for him and he could certainly do better than that. Conceptual ideals are just as good as the platonic realm without the incoherent baggage.
"Similarly, when I claim that genocide is wrong, I am not making an objective claim about the morality of an action; I am expressing an opinion."
People apply their moral desires in ignorance and are typically untalented at it and understanding the consequences of it. Genocide can be shown to be an error of judgment given what their primary motivation already is, if they are claiming to be acting under moral pretenses. There will be no stop to the "kill before they kill you" tribal attitude as long as the gratuitious deprioritization of human life is a normative cultural attitude. Insecurity isn't a very good substitute for a more sensible long term option.
Genocide is an extreme example, but the noise of subjectivity in general shouldn't be an excuse to not recognize the indispensable commonalities that go into any proposition said to be moral and the ever ready room for improvement. As long as we can come up with criteria to sort through our moral "givens" and as long as we can always use what we have in some better and better way, that sounds like a fairly objective recipe to me. This can't be boiled down purely to preference. We didn't create the psychological principles we are struggling to apply and that "emergent property" status that our minds have is a level of discourse that never seems to find a healthy standing in this kind of conversation. Not everything works as well as everything else just because you may want it to. It is all still "just physics," but that's not the most convenient reference point to talk about how it works at our level. We are able to connect with each other on common moral ground because we aren't systemically divergent enough to really claim to be operating on an entirely different platform. Obviously this isn't absolute and there is more than one way to go about attaining greater accuracy with the system at hand, but it should be considered that even the mammalian kingdom has much of the same basic recipe going for it at the psychological level, minus the developed intellect to formulate the more complex ideas about it and behaviors. We're on pretty firm proverbial ground if we so choose to recognize it and the fact that theists can get away with thinking morality is so objectively absolute should be evidence to them that in the event theism turns out to be false, something else must account for that general consistency.
On the scale of things, I'm farthest from Keith Augustine, not too far off from Jeff Lowder, and virtually identical to Richard Carrier. Good call providing links.
When I am asked whether objective moral values exist, I could say, "Why yes they do." But I know that means something entirely different to you than it does to me (and other atheists seem to have adopted the theistic intentions of the terms) and it's not quite fair that the philosophical fine print of one system (everything outside the bubble of middle world) is blown out of proportion for the sake of contrast with another. Hence I'm not allowed to use these simple straight forward terms because of all the linguistic superstitions surrounding them. Do I "really" mean it? No, I don't "really" mean it like a theist's superstitions would have it, but I do "really" mean it in the way that I really do and it is analogous to the validity of your basic perceptions. One can practically make use of the concept in an every day setting even if there is no actual Platonic connection. It makes the most sense to me to adjust the basics of middle world sensibilities to the facts of science in a simple and straight forward way that retains all the basic notions of interaction we are used to. It's unfortunate that theism typically puts society so far back in terms of progress in that regard. Que the pop-up version of Christopher Hitchens, "Religion poisons everything." :pI consider my moral paradigm to be "real" in the sense that it is and to "exist" in the sense that it does (it is a real pattern I confront in my mind, right?), and I consider there to be better more objective moral assessments than others (that map more accurately onto the external world and produce discernibly better results) and I consider there to be common values and ethical principles that people can't really do without even if the application of those abstractions in all sorts of contexts can yield a wide spectrum of subjective results. We may very well find this same moral pattern analogous to prosperity, empathy, and reciprocation born out in alien minds from other planets because of it's incidental utility for the "selfish" gene via "convergent evolution." And truly whenever the ingredients of the recipe come together, there you will by definition always find that same pattern. How could it be any other way and why does "something else" need to be involved? The "problem of universals" is a false mystery, in my opinion. Things just are what they are. They don't need help existing.
Superman: "Don't worry, miss. I've got you."
Lois Lane: "You've got me? Who's got you?"
Superman: "It's a movie, bitch. Just shut your trap."
Why can't I say then that objective moral values exist? Why can it not simply be understood in the way that I mean it rather than having to come up with a bunch of new terms that would seem to imply an entirely new bizarro world of moral propositions as though we weren't already working with at the very least the kernel of "real morality" for the last 10,000 years or more? The "new" atheists aren't re-inventing the moral wheel here, but we are trying to understand better what the wheel actually is and how it came to be the way it is in light of better information about how the world actually works, and apart from the superstitions surrounding that age old basic abstract. I shouldn't even have to mention that I understand all of this (as far as I know) consistently within the context of all the many things I've said throughout my site (in terms of nontheism, evolution, physicalism, materialism, determinism/compatibilism, and the infinite backdrop of "fully articulated chaos") that you've already been exposed to. Moral values are systemic and the special arrangement of system is all physical contingency. They are as real as they appear to be and you don't really get to choose how your basic operating system works or the incidence of how that pattern comes together best in any moral framework you may find most suitable to work with.
My best assessment is that your "survey question" is invalid and that there was no reason to ask it unless you were begging the question with loaded starting assumptions. It could just be a matter of allowing me to define each aspect in the way that I do, but it has to be said that you cannot have the yes/no answer you are searching for as you likely conceive of it.
Whatever reason it is that you won't accept that your question is invalid is our specific and possibly only significant point of disagreement. And as far as I know I've advocated a complete picture already. Everything I'm saying here can be derived from things I've said elsewhere (especially here and here) and I know you're smart and can pull things together on your own...so my unfortunate task is to as delicately as possible point out the persistent problem.
That was funny and painless, right? The question is pointless. We disagree on the nature of universalism. Continuing to ask loaded universalism based questions begs the question and is a symptom of "I'm not willing to think of it any other way." Um...okay? I'm sure you can trick a few atheists into answering it. Hurray! Feel free to ignore a hundred good reasons to think otherwise about universals but expect the same response to every new variation of the same theme.
It's no big deal...pretty much every theistic philosopher I've met here on xanga does it in some way or another. It does get pretty annoying having to slice and reslice the same information because someone has decided to misunderstand in a slightly different way.
Speaking of annoying, remember the time when...Here (and here), you try to sell the idea that the "old" atheists had the right idea that trying to live the amoral grind of random chance was a good idea. You see it as the logical conclusion of non-theism, and I see it as senseless reactionaryism that I could have told you was doomed to fail before they even started writing their atheist manifestos. It's fairly obvious our middle world sensibilities were catered to live in close proximity to the vitality of life in that system. Spreading the hot coals to the four winds wasn't going to be a good idea. It doesn't mean that fire burns all the way up to heaven. There's no rule that says you can't embrace the exploits of your system as they appear to be and merely understand them differently in a technically accurate sense.
Here, you try to sell the idea that there is some rule in chaos that prevents the incidence of what we would label order. "Fully articulated chaos" is neither chaos nor order. It just is what it is since we are in "brute fact" land. The labels we put on the incidence are simply what correspond to our preconceived notions of each. From the most accurate point of reference however (the brute fact of all existence), there's really no meaningful difference.
(Sense and Goodness, pg. 86): "It follows that every random chaos will always, as a matter of logical necessity, contain many pools of order."
Here, I actually agree with you. Only some multiverse theorists (to my knowledge) like Max Tegmark actually attempt to account philosophically for the "abitrary ontology" factor inherent in that kind of atheistic "loose end".It requires noticing that our definition of arbitrary is dependent on the possibility of it being another way. If all possibility exists, then it cannot fit the definition of arbitrary and the problem is resolved. This is simplest idea I know of that contends for brutest fact of them all and requires fewer assumptions than theism to account for particularity of the realm we do know of.
"To illustrate his argument, Tegmark gives the example of the of the numbers between 0 and 1. A useful definition of something's complexity is the length of a computer program needed to generate it. Imagine trying to generate a single number berween 0 and 1, specified by an infinite number of decimal places. Expressing it would take an infinitely long computer program. But to generate all numbers between 0 and 1, all you would have to do is start at 0, step through 0-1, 0-2 and so on, then 0-01, 0-11, 0-21 and so on--an easy program to write. In other words, creating all possibilities is much simpler than creating one very specific one."
Here, much like the unicornists from my analogy earlier, you almost seem to express your joy that atheists have taken theism much too seriously. The philosophical castles of theism hardly need to be "replaced." Rather our culturally inherited preconceived notions about what theism was supposedly doing for us need to be checked at the door. Theism was only doing the job well because we weren't paying very close attention.
Here, you seem to assume that the essence of God is immune from the very same criticism you have just voiced. What makes the logos the way it is? Why should it be trusted? Why is it just not a random, arbitrary, "chaotic" happenstance of being that you would otherwise be absolutely against? What defines it? At least evolution provides a means by which the virgin abstract of it can be field tested through trial and error over long periods of time, cultivating a pattern we could call the faculty of reason. The field of chaos does not have a rule against us existing in the way that we apparently do. It just means there's a whole lot not like us lucky lottery winners (as much as it takes).
Then, I stepped in and laughed with you at the army of arguments you faced, while you were busy doing your thing. Rather than making fun of the 101 arguments against Christianity, perhaps you should consider the weight of that evidence on those simpler terms rather than trying to overturn a vast landscape of arguments to the better explanation with some philosophical technicality only the select few might comprehend.Here, you say you should have pulled your punch more often. Noted. Not sure if it changes anything here. It seems your articulation of nominalism is purely anti-universalism incarnate and no doubt as stated, it doesn't seem to make a terrible lot of sense other than to just be the bizarrely articulate opposite of universalism. I think that gives universalism too much credit. And I'm still not sure what "nonzero interval of space" means.
Here, you note I do in fact think the positions you've laid out are entirely nonsensical criticality displacement. From my point of view you're stuck on a systemic mirage. I'm also not going to apologize for the dissensible nature of the atheists before me who wore the boots laid out for them by their opponents. They were wrong in the way that they were. End of story. Perhaps they did the best they could with what they got and were influential at the time and said what needed to be said in that climate, but you give them too much convenient credit. The solution, is the solution, is the solution. Doesn't matter who writes it, or when, or if they don't happen to be saying the right thing at the right juncture of history when incidental ears are the most receptive to it. You care about truth, right?Outro:
It's too bad many atheists are behind in the game, the public is too poisoned by religion to think straight, and theists like yourself are too sure God is the only solution to the problem and too preoccupied with avoiding nihilism to notice he doesn't. :p Sorry, Jargon. My experience is this all comes to you in droves on its own the instant you stop presuming God has to factor into the equation. The reason theism is not compelling in any way is that it doesn't ever explain anything, it always compounds the problem with interest, and there's never a discernable reason why what we had to start with couldn't account for what we were looking for in the first place. It is the philosophical scenic route to nowhere.
Ben
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Comments (17)
I did not know that you had such an extensive knowledge of Mr. Jargon's words. Your deconstruction here seems fairly complete.
I haven't had occasion to bump into him in the Xanga world lately, but from what I remember, I'm actually surprised at this point that he's remained a theist. Nerdy Star Wars reference: Perhaps he can yet be turned to....the dark side.
Jesus Christ... I don't understand half of this shit. One quick thought that jumped into my mind was the fact that I'm not a friggin' nihilist even though I am an atheist. And I honestly don't see why "objective moral values" indicate a Creator... at all. They're not absolute, for one. And two, many atheists (like Elbow_Cheese on one of my older blogs) will argue that morality is an innate biological device which developed while we were still evolving. Would we be here today if our ancestors before us killed each other out of pure paranoia? Maybe not. Hell, a lot of what we consider to be "moral" is derived from what our culture tells us. Is it moral to walk around naked in public? Some cultures do this all the friggin' time like in Africa, but here it would be considered "immoral" or at the very least, "indecent" which is punishable by law. So I believe that a lot of our morality is purely relative to our culture, the way that we were raised, and our experiences, but some morals are objective, although not necessarily absolute. Would it be considered moral to kill somebody for any reason other than to serve your primary interests like protecting yourself in all cultures by all people? I would strongly doubt it.
Anyway, thanks for the read. It looks pretty good. I'd have to read it a couple more times to thoroughly digest it, but those are my sentimentalities so far. I wish to see if you agree with the gist of them.
P.S.>What the hell is a nominalist, btw?
My question was nothing but a mere probe droid, and it's more than effectively performed its task.
@mr_jargon - Care to share?
I wanted to see how different folks would unpack, qualify and contextualize the question before answering the question and the steps taken in formulating an answer. This ethics question forced you to outline a theory of meaning and the relationship of co-existing language-games to each other and I am interested in your equating them with "levels" of reality. The appearance/reality and subjective/objective distinction must be employed at some point, and I need to see a certain amount of instances before I'm able to extract a pattern. I have to see what items you choose nominalize (reduce to name, place in conceptual realm) and what you choose to leave 'out there' in reality itself. It seems that you want to reduce truth-correspondence and meaning to consistency within a language game, place as much conceivable weight as possible on pre-contextualized sensation but retain all (Western) commonsense notions about reality as unbacked givens.
@mr_jargon - Thanks for unpacking.
@Extremegoatmaster -
One quick thought that jumped into my mind was the fact that I'm not a friggin' nihilist even though I am an atheist.
The nature and existence of objective moral values is one question, and how we come to know them is another. I have serious trouble explaining their reality & our knowledge of them if materialism is true. Consider the following:
(1) Some physical state of affairs obtains.
(2) We have positive or negative feelings about this state of affairs.
(3) There is some value X or Y for which I should have feelings or act one way rather than another.
(4) I somehow know that there is some such value X or Y.
I do not see how a nontheist materialist can affirm items (3) & (4) without serious difficulties. I am not saying that you can't; I'm saying that I can't think of a way. If you can, then I am more than willing to hear your argument.
Would we be here today if our ancestors before us killed each other out of pure paranoia?
I don't see what relevant questions this fact answers. I'm not making a claim one way or the other; I'm simply stating that I don't see it.
And two, many atheists (like Elbow_Cheese on
one of my older blogs) will argue that morality is an innate biological
device which developed while we were still evolving.
Please define the meaning of 'morality' within this context. Even if biology provides a sufficient explanation of certain beliefs, desires and dispositions to act, it is still the case that (1) the origin of a belief and the nature of its truth-conditions are not reducible to one another and (2) the question of criteria by which to assess the "goodness-badness" of desires and acts remains unanswered. Also, if one *reduces* moral goodness with the effectiveness-ineffectiveness of means, social utility &/or individual tastes, then one is still an ethical nihilist because morality has been emptied of reality or objective end(s) and made a function of unpremised human decision.
@Extremegoatmaster - P.S.>What the hell is a nominalist, btw?
I know this question was not addressed to me so I hope you don't mind my taking a stab at it. A 'universal' is ANYthing common to two or more particulars. Realists affirm the existence of universals; nominalists deny their existence. To affirm that something is an X is to make a it member of a category and without universals or shared properties it becomes difficult to explain how that actually possible. Carrier's statement seems to presuppose the falsity of nominalism because he asserts that there is some category called 'words' and that members of this category 'refer' to physical states of affairs. Reference (whatever it is) is then a real relation that obtains among two or more instances of objects in the same category: words. ARU seems to equate all realisms with Platonic realism in which certain abstract realities are placed into an transcendent immaterial realm.
Objective moral values are only as real as they appear to be.
Incidentally the person noticing is also only as real as he/she appears
to be.
Objective moral values are only as real as they appear to some observer and the observer is only as real "as they appear to be" (to whom?) The first claim just looks like a mere restatement of moral subjectivism and the latter the quasi-theistic collapse of being into 'being perceived by someone' and of 'being right' into what some Ideal Observer would do or want to do (Berkeley). I think the fact that these horribly ambiguous statements are not immediately clarified shifts the blame of misinterpretation on your shoulders.
If you are using the terms of the emergent personal sphere, you use the
terms of the personal sphere. If you use the terms of physics, then
you use the terms of physics. If you use the terms of your
understanding all of existence, then you use those terms.
So do these irreducibly distinct language-games correspond to irreducibly distinct levels in reality? If so, then the physical and the mental are properties of some underlying substratum, as opposed to the physicalist thesis that the physical constitutes the substratum such that the mental is either reducible to or identical with it. The only way to avoid this pluralistic implication is to make 'truth' a property of the language-games themselves rather than relation between the language and reality, but this view is riddled with innumerable problems of its own.
How else can we correct our own moral method or discern that someone
else's moral ways are better than our or deficient? There has to be
something objective about it in order to pull that off.
WE DON'T ever actually "correct" our moral method or "discern" that
another method is "better" than ours; that's the whole point of moral
subjectivism! The above completely begs
the question. Simply stating that objective moral values are necessary
conditions of real moral progress or the discernment of real moral
goodness does not constitute an argument.
Apparently he's abandoned any criteria for sorting out good moral premises from bad moral premises.
Of course he has! He's a moral subjectivist; he not only explicitly
states numerous times that there are no objective criteria whatsoever,
he denies that there are any objectively good or bad premises to sort
through in the first place!!!
As long as we can come up with criteria to sort through our moral
"givens" and as long as we can always use what we have in some better
and better way, that sounds like a fairly objective recipe to me.
So as long as you have a workable criterion to sort and arrange your
objective moral values with maximal efficacy, then you're all good?
Well, of course!
This can't be boiled down purely to preference.
How do you know? Do you have a non-circular deductive proof or empirical-inductive argument for this claim or is this just another instance of a priori knowledge for you?
We didn't create the psychological principles we are struggling to
apply and that "emergent property" status that our minds have is a
level of discourse that never seems to find a healthy standing in this
kind of conversation.
Why in the world does this fact about the origins of our psychological principles matter unless morality is reducible to preference?
It is all still "just physics," but that's not the most convenient reference point to talk about how it works at our level.
'Convenience' concerns the efficacy-accessibility of means. It's
unclear whether or not by "just physics" you're contradicting yourself
about the irreducibly distinct nature of language-games or making the
object of physics the ultimate (and only) substrate of reality itself;
either way your claim that this 'referent point' is not 'convenient' to
talk about 'our level' is completely nonsensical.
We are able to connect with each other on common moral ground because
we aren't systemically divergent enough to really claim to be operating
on an entirely different platform.
Commonality of psychological dispositions alone does not entail the
existence of objective moral values or explain how we come to know
them. What about stuff like the Nazi genocides & Communist
massacres or even something more mundane like rapists and serial
killers? Why are these instances not sufficient empirical disproof of
this non-divergence theory? The only possible explanation is that
everyone starts off *knowing* (and having a desire to do) right and
wrong, but then society corrupts them; I don't see you playing this
metaphysical wild-card. Perhaps I err here.
It's too bad many atheists are behind in the game,
the public is too poisoned by religion to think straight, and theists like
yourself are too sure God is the only solution to the problem and too
preoccupied with avoiding nihilism to notice he doesn't.
What's the game? What
is the goal and how does one score points? By what non-arbitrary
criteria have you established the characteristics of straight-thinking?
How is religion being defined and what's the problem I think God is the
only solution for?
From my point of view you're stuck on a systemic mirage.
Upon what rock of self-evident, absolutely certain, undeniable truth do
you stand in order to make that kind of observation and how does one
come to it? I repeatedly ask in order that I may consider stepping on
myself, but a substantive answer has yet to be clearly articulated.
@mr_jargon - Let me know when you think you've got all your thoughts down so the back and forth doesn't get too convoluted.
Everything about metaphysics, epistemology, language-games and truth ignore. I only want to cover ethics here because the rest I'll cover in a future post of mine. Who knows? I may go over ethics again anyway.
(pg. 31): "Now
an early mistake can be made, a wrong turn taken. If this idea of
meaning is not realized, it is easy to forget what things really mean,
to get confused about what words refer to. I think Plato got
confused. By not realizing that words are names that people made up to
describe their sensations, he got around to thinking that ideas, even
numbers, had a supernatural substance, that they were themselves
distinct 'things', more than mere labels or codes. There are people
who still think this even today..."
(N1): All words are names people make up to describe the contents of their individual sensations.
(N2): Numbers are nothing more than man-made labels & codes, not distinct realities in themselves.
However, if it is true that many people are confused about the idea of meaning, then (in the Carrier universe) this "idea" itself (and their thoughts about it) must be (1) a name for a sensed object, (2) an object of sensation or (3) a individual material particular or collection of such particulars. If the idea of meaning and people's thoughts about it cannot be classed as (1)-(3), then somewhere Carrier has contradicted himself.
@Agnostics_R_Us -
Ben,
I tried. I really did. For some time now, I have been diligently working my way through Richard Carrier’s “Sense and Goodness Without God.” But now I feel like it’s time to put it down, perhaps for good.
There was, quite honestly, a lot wrong with this book. I’ll give you several brief lists.
The first list is things that are certainly not lethal to a book’s credibility, but do raise eyebrows
1) It was self published.
2) Any real citation (besides “recommended reading”) was strangely absent. Odd, especially for an academic work.
3) The tone throughout was extremely arrogant
4) It was written, as far as I can tell, by a history major who is now in graduate school. Why is anyone listening to him concerning philosophy and science? His argument had better be stellar...
5) It is too large. He tries to do way more than needed for a defense of metaphysical naturalism, especially his section on politics. It often seems disorganized.
6) He refers to later parts of his book in the earlier parts. Not the greatest of evils, but it does make it hard to follow.
As previously mentioned, none of these things, in and of themselves, or even combined, necessitate the discrediting of a work. The following, however, are more serious.
1) He makes a ridiculous amount of unsubstantiated statements, especially in his introductory statements about philosophy. This is even more absurd in his constant emphasis on the need for evidence (more on this in the next section).
2) He is constantly overgeneralizing, oversimplifying, and creating strawmen (and then gallantly knocks them over).
3) His is often logically inconsistent.
This could actually be expanded further. I realize that I haven’t provided any examples, for which I’m sorry, but more on that later as well. These things, mentioned above, are reasonable grounds for the discrediting of a work. However, the work does not fall here primarily, but rather is weakest when such poor scholarship and inconsistency bleeds into the system of philosophy that he is defending. The next list is a list of some of the weaknesses in the ideas that he is presenting.
1) His entire argument is based on propositional truth statements and their validity. This focus on propositional statements, and his assertion that these obviously define truth, ignores at least a century and a half of existential philosophy, and the basic philosophical conversation as a whole. Can a history major be excused for such lack of knowledge. Certainly. Should he be writing about philosophy without some understanding of this important tension. Probably not. He does not first have to answer to the theist, but to the philosopher. Then again, this lapse in his academic discipline is hardly surprising given the sloppiness in the book at large
2) He puts reason on a pedestal. This is not altogether wrong. There are few that argue that reason can be useful in many functions. However, there is also (again, largely in the existential, as well as the psychological, school of thought) significant concern that an over emphasis on reason leads to the fracturing of man as a psychological being, even resulting in his mental destruction. Is this true? Perhaps, perhaps not, but it is without a doubt an issue that needs to be raised in defending a system built up around reason.... One might of thought that his interaction with the Oriental religions would have provided him with some insight about the limits of reason, but such as not the case.
3) His conception of the multiverse is almost completely faith based. Sure, there’s a bit of speculative evidence, but nothing to hang your coat on. And how about this: if time really is only perception, if the universe is fixed, and if, due to certainty in probability, every type of universe will come into existence, doesn’t it stand to “reason” that the same universe would also come into existence? Not the same basic universe, but an identical universe, in which everyone did the exact same thing they did in this one. If this is the case, then consciousness, being physical, would necessitate that the same person exist again. We are then trapped in something that is strangely similar to Nietzsche’s idea of the Eternal recurrence. Since, as Carrier states, meaning is a result of limited time, our existence no longer has meaning, for we are no longer limited by it. More on meaning in a second.
4) We value things because they are valuable. This sort of statement is completely useless.
5) Things have meaning because we give them meaning. Equally useless. Actually, his discussion concerning meaning in general is not only extremely hard to follow, it is also ridiculous in its assertion. Basically our lives have meaning because we give them meaning. This doesn’t say anything about why. It is merely a empirical observation.
There is more I could say, but I wont.
I have read several biting criticisms and critiques of Christianity. Nietzsche was a powerful argument against Christianity. Sartre was a powerful argument against Christianity. Joseph Campbell was a powerful argument against Christianity. Carrier is more akin to a whining teenager, filled with bitterness and anger, with an overly inflated opinion of himself, who is more obnoxious than any sort of challenge. I came to this book looking for something that would challenge me, and force me to grow in my thinking. Instead, I was kind of annoyed, and extremely disappointed.
Again, I know that I didn’t give many examples of the things I accused Carrier of, in a way, making me no better than him in my academic rigor. However, here you will find an extensive review of Sense and Goodness, with numerous examples of his poor logic.
I don’t necessarily agree with the reviewer theologically or philosophically. However, he does do an excellent job of voicing my frustration with the work and in providing examples of Carrier’s inconsistency. Read it and tell me what you think. I’d be interested.
~dan
@c1ayne - I have a lot of things going on as usual (especially with Jargon up above whom I owe several responses already), and it seems prudent to merely let Carrier speak for himself against David Wood's review.
@c1ayne - I have read several biting criticisms and
critiques of Christianity. Nietzsche was a powerful argument against
Christianity. Sartre was a powerful argument against Christianity.
Joseph Campbell was a powerful argument against Christianity. Carrier
is more akin to a whining teenager, filled with bitterness and anger,
with an overly inflated opinion of himself, who is more obnoxious than
any sort of challenge. I came to this book looking for something that
would challenge me, and force me to grow in my thinking. Instead, I was
kind of annoyed, and extremely disappointed.
You describe my own experience quite perfectly; I could have easily written these words myself.
@mr_jargon - I have good deal of my responses typed out already, but what I'm really hoping for (perhaps not in vain) is to attempt to take the conversation to some new productive level. I don't always have the likes of you and Dan around and the "old responses" while valid would likely be yet another exercise in futility. I already know how that stuff goes, and I'd prefer to learn something new. So I'm kind of taking my time, dispassionately reviewing what I've got and what you continue with as you wait, and pondering what that would amount to and how we can help each other rather than the stereotypical clashing. I'll be trying to make sure I'm coming up with potential criteria on each item and open options I think to discuss and compare, as I see it (that you've already led the way on, a bit) rather than rehashing the old soap boxes. I hope you aren't in too much of a hurry. Obviously I'm not.
@c1ayne - I'm sorry that was your impression of Carrier. I won't attempt to change it, though I do see him quite a bit differently. He did just complete his PhD, I think, and he is co-editor and chief of Infidels.org and as far as I'm concerned the most courteous and "down to business" debater I know. Rather than save him, perhaps that just means atheists are "that bad" eh? But kudos to you for giving it a go. "I survived Richard Carrier" is apparently your reward and I can't say you haven't been as exposed to "real atheism" as you can be. I will ask though in terms of the best defense of "real Christianity" (and perhaps best critique of atheism/other world views) what work you would recommend?
ARU